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Review Article: Rethinking Party Politics and the
Welfare State – Recent Advances in the Literature
SILJA HA¨USERMANN, GEORG PICOT AND DOMINIK GEERING*
This article discusses recent research on party politics and the welfare state that differs from
traditional ‘partisan politics theory’. The traditional approach states that left-wing and right-wing
parties hold contrasting positions on welfare issues, depending on the interests of their respective
electorates. This view has recently been challenged by three strands of research, which emphasize
(1) the effects of electoral change on parties’ policy positions, (2) the role of context, notably electoral
institutions, party competition and the conﬁguration of party systems, and (3) the impact of different
linkages between parties and electorates (particularistic versus programmatic). The implications of
these arguments for the applicability of partisan theory are presented, and theoretical and empirical
issues are identiﬁed for further research.
The objective of this article is to highlight and discuss new approaches regarding the
relationship between party politics and the welfare state. These approaches can be
qualiﬁed as new because they differ from traditional ‘partisan politics theory’. The latter
is a well-established theoretical strand in comparative welfare state research and, more
broadly, in comparative political economy. In a nutshell, it sees parties as representatives
of social constituencies, mostly deﬁned in terms of industrial classes, and as bearers of
clear ideological stances for social-democratic or conservative welfare policies. Social
policy output, in this view, depends on the partisan composition of government.
New ways of conceptualizing the role and impact of political parties on social and
economic policies have been thriving in recent years, but the different contributions have
neither been reviewed nor connected. This is what we do in this article. We identify three
ways in which recent studies depart from traditional theory. First, it must be taken into
account that electoral constituencies have changed and do not correspond to those of the
industrial age anymore. Secondly, various contributions have shown that the institutional
context, party systems and party competition matter for the kind of welfare policies
individual political parties advocate. Thirdly, diverse links between parties and electorates
(particularistic versus programmatic) shape the policy strategies adopted by parties.
Traditional partisan politics theory assumes a linear and direct relationship between the
type of party in power (e.g. social-democratic or conservative) and policy output. Each of
the three strands of research that we are going to address in this article questions this
linear relationship in its own way. The empirical analysis of changing socio-structural
electoral constituencies alters our expectations, because it means that parties represent
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different interests from the ones that marked their ideological proﬁles in the early decades
of welfare state growth.1 If, in turn, we take context seriously, both in terms of institutions
and party competition, the expected policy preference of a party is not ‘given’ by its
ideological party family, but is conditional on the interaction with institutions or rival
parties.2 Similarly, acknowledging the importance of voter–party linkages reminds us that
parties often use policies in a particularistic way rather than in the programmatic way
implied by the traditional theory of partisan politics. Hence, parties with the same
ideological label may make different choices if they act under particularistic competition.3
Each of these three strands of research has its own distinct implications. But all of them
imply that we cannot adequately grasp the complex relationship between political parties
and the welfare state unless we update and expand our model of party politics. Yet, in
many respects the old partisan theory remains, of course, valuable. Consequently, in this
article, we propose scope conditions in which traditional partisan politics theory may
apply, and we also discuss research strategies for those cases where the traditional
approach cannot be applied in a straightforward way.
In our discussion of recent research on partisan politics, we do not aim at an exhaustive
review of research on political parties and political economy, an endeavour that would be
doomed to failure given the breadth of the topic. Rather, we concentrate on recent
contributions that satisfy two criteria: ﬁrst, we focus on the literature in comparative welfare
state research. That is to say, we do not discuss similar contributions that belong to the wider
ﬁeld of comparative political economy, such as industrial relations or social pacts.4 Secondly,
we focus on those welfare state studies that clearly refer to political parties. This excludes
studies that focus on government strategies independently of party political considerations.5
1 E.g., David Rueda, Social Democracy Inside Out: Partisanship and Labor Market Policy in Advanced
Industrialized Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Desmond King and David Rueda, ‘Cheap
Labor: The New Politics of ‘‘Bread and Roses’’ in Industrial Democracies’, Perspectives on Politics, 6 (2008),
279–97; Silja Ha¨usermann, The Politics of Welfare State Reform in Continental Europe : Modernization in Hard
Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European
Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Herbert Kitschelt and Philip Rehm, ‘Work,
Family and Politics. Foundations of Electoral Partisan Alignments in Postindustrial Democracies’ (paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., 2005).
2 E.g., Herbert Kitschelt, ‘Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment. When Do
Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?’ in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 265–302; Christoffer Green-Pedersen, ‘Welfare State
Retrenchment in Denmark and the Netherlands, 1982–1998: The Role of Party Competition and Party
Consensus’, Comparative Political Studies, 34 (2001), 963–85; Torben Iversen and David Soskice,
‘Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than
Others’, American Political Science Review, 100 (2006), 165–81; Maurizio Ferrera, Modelli Di Solidarieta`:
Politica E Riforme Sociali Nelle Democrazie (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993); Georg Picot, Politics of
Segmentation: Party Competition and Social Protection in Europe (London: Routledge, 2012).
3 E.g., Julia Lynch, Age in the Welfare State: The Origins of Social Spending on Pensioners, Workers,
and Children (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and
Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1992); Margarita Este´vez-Abe, Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
4 E.g., Cathie Jo Martin and Duane Swank, ‘The Political Origins of Coordinated Capitalism:
Business Organizations, Party Systems, and State Structure in the Age of Innocence’, American Political
Science Review, 102 (2008), 181–98; Kerstin Hamann and John Kelly, ‘Party Politics and the
Reemergence of Social Pacts in Western Europe’, Comparative Political Studies, 40 (2007), 971–94.
5 Such as David Natali and Martin Rhodes, ‘The ‘‘New Politics’’ of Pension Reforms in Continental
Europe’, in Camila Arza and Martin Kohli, eds, Pension Reform in Europe: Politics, Policies and
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In the following, we distinguish between an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ school of studies on the
role of political parties in welfare state politics. The terms ‘old’ and ‘new’ are, however,
not primarily used in a temporal sense, since the traditional partisan politics school is
clearly alive and retains a considerable and robust explanatory role for some research
questions. In that sense, the ‘new’ approaches we discuss are not aimed at entirely
replacing or invalidating the traditional approach. However, they all deviate from the ‘old
school’ approach by theorizing and conceptualizing factors that limit or question the key
assumption underlying the traditional approach. This key assumption holds that we can
deduce the policy preferences of a political party directly from its party family or even
from its label. Therefore, one of the main contributions of this review article is to specify
the scope conditions under which traditional partisan politics assumptions are justiﬁed,
and to discuss the empirical and theoretical implications if one or several of these
conditions are not present.
Where does the recent questioning of traditional party politics theory come from? We
believe that an important impulse can be found in the debate on the ‘New Politics of the
Welfare State’, which stirred up comparative welfare state research in the late 1990s and
early 2000s6 – even if some signiﬁcant re-considerations of the role of parties are to be
found earlier.7 The New Politics literature focused primarily on the path-dependent
effects of established policies. It argued that the very expansion of the welfare state itself
changed the rules of the political game by changing the preferences and expectations of
voters and interest organizations. Hence, the effect of partisanship on policy output and
outcome would have been weakened, if not erased, by policy legacies. This argument, of
course, provoked a wave of reactions, not only in defence of the traditional approach, but
also – more constructively – in an effort to re-conceptualize the ways in which parties
might still matter.8 For instance, it was argued that parties may behave differently
depending on the context of policy making (credit-claiming during welfare expansion v.
blame-avoidance in times of austerity),9 or that social-democratic parties might even be in
a better position to reform the welfare state than conservative parties.10 Since then, more
(F’note continued)
Outcomes (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 25–46; Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘Does Discourse Matter in the
Politics of Welfare State Adjustment?’ Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), 168–93.
6 Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Paul Pierson, ‘The New Politics of the Welfare State’,
World Politics, 48 (1996), 143–79; Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001).
7 Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol, ‘Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Public
Social Spending in Britain, 1900–1911, and the United States, 1880s–1920’, American Sociological Review,
49 (1984), 726–50.
8 Maurizio Ferrera, ‘The European Welfare State: Golden Achievements, Silver Prospects’, West
European Politics, 31 (2008), 82–107; Christoffer Green-Pedersen and Markus Haverland, ‘Review Essay:
The New Politics and Scholarship of the Welfare State’, Journal of European Social Policy, 12 (2002),
43–51. Jane Gingrich, Making Markets in the Welfare State. The Politics of Varying Market Reforms
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
9 Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State.
10 Karen M. Anderson and Traute Meyer, ‘Social Democracy, Unions, and Pension Politics in
Germany and Sweden’, Journal of Public Policy, 23 (2003), 23–54; Jonah D. Levy, ‘Vice into Virtue?
Progressive Politics and Welfare Reform in Continental Europe’, Politics & Society, 27 (1999), 239–73;
Fiona Ross, ‘‘‘Beyond Left and Right’’: The New Partisan Politics of Welfare’, Governance, 13 (2000),
155–83.
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and more researchers have taken up the task of rethinking party politics and the welfare
state, but their contributions have so far been neither systematized nor connected, and
this is what we aim at doing in this review article.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section we revisit the traditional partisan
politics theories of the welfare state. Then we discuss three strands of new research
on party politics and the welfare state, followed by a section on the implications of these
new approaches for the use of the traditional theory of partisan politics and for new
paths of analysis. A ﬁnal section concludes by identifying the most promising routes for
further research.
‘OLD SCHOOL’: PARTISAN POLITICS AND THE WELFARE STATE
The partisan politics approach to welfare state analysis has emerged as a rival explanation
to structural Marxist, functionalist and pluralist theories from the 1970s onwards.11 The
ﬁrst thorough comparative analyses regarding the effect of political parties on distributive
policies have been presented by Hibbs, Tufte and Hewitt.12 These authors demonstrated
that left-wing parties took different policy decisions and were associated with more
redistribution, tracing these partisan effects back to the distinct class constituency of left-
wing and right-wing parties. In a similar, basically symmetrical vein, Borg and Castles,
and Castles separately,13 have demonstrated effects of the political right on policy output.
Parallel to this ‘parties-matter’ literature, a related but separate theory on the impact of
social-democratic parties on the welfare state has been developed by John Stephens and
by Walter Korpi.14 This power resources theory shares the argument that party politics
shape social policy and political economy, but it lays more emphasis on the mobilization
of socio-structural classes as the basis of party politics, and on the impact of other class
actors such as trade unions. Korpi argued that social policy should be understood as a
result of the democratic class struggle, since democracy provides the working-class parties
with the opportunity to move ‘the struggle for distribution y into the political arena,
where their numerical strength can be used more effectively’.15 The social rights won in
the parliamentary arena then feed back into the economic sphere as new power resources,
counterbalancing the power of capital. In line with power resources theory, Esping-
Andersen argued that social-democratic parties not only develop these social policies as
11 Kees Van Kersbergen and Uwe Becker, ‘Comparative Politics and the Welfare State’, in Hans
Keman, ed, Comparative Democratic Politics. A Guide to Contemporary Theory and Research (London:
SAGE Publications Ltd, 2002): 185–214.
12 Douglas A. Hibbs Jr, ‘Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy’, American Political Science
Review, 71 (1977), 1467–87; Edward R. Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1978); Christopher Hewitt, ‘The Effect of Political Democracy and Social
Democracy on Equality in Industrial Societies: A Cross-National Comparison’, American Sociological
Review, 42 (1977), 450–64.
13 Sten G. Borg and Francis G. Castles, ‘The Inﬂuence of the Political Right on Public Income
Maintenance Expenditure and Equality’, Political Studies, 29 (1981), 604–21; Francis G. Castles, The
Social Democratic Image of Society : A Study of the Achievements and Origins of Scandinavian Social
Democracy in Comparative Perspective (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).
14 John D. Stephens, The Transition from Socialism to Capitalism (London: Macmillan, 1979); Walter
Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); Walter Korpi, ‘Power
Politics and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship: Social Rights during Sickness in
Eighteen OECD Countries since 1930’, American Sociological Review, 54 (1989), 309–28.
15 Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle, p. 170.
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resources for wage-earners and the worse-off, but also as distinct instruments to inﬂuence
class formation and thereby social democracy’s mobilization power.16 In this manner,
power resources theory made the link between class mobilization, party afﬁliation and
partisan government more explicit than the original partisan-politics literature. It added
nuanced arguments on the role of collective action through parties and unions, emphasized
the feedback effects of policies on collective mobilization and supported the constituency-
party link with detailed studies on the class structure of politics.17
Both the ‘parties-matter’ studies and power resource theory set out the theoretical
framework for a large number of studies using the ‘partisan politics matter’ hypothesis in
their work.18 Using mostly quantitative methods, these authors test whether stronger left-
wing parties – measured by parliamentary or cabinet seats – lead to an expansion of the
welfare state. All these studies ‘postulate’19 that left parties mobilize the lower wage
earners and the ‘working class, as the ﬂagship of redistributive collectivism’.20 Thereby,
politics is often seen in an overly simpliﬁed way, ‘as a simple transmission belt conveying
the preferences and demands of various interest groups to the leaders, who implement
them’ (as Korpi himself puts it in a criticism of simpliﬁed partisan politics scholarship).21
In its most reduced version – labelled ‘partisan difference theory’ – the partisan politics
approach simply tests whether the complexion of government on a left–right scale matters
for policy outputs.22 As conditions changed from the era of expansion to times of
austerity, a mirror-reasoning was applied to welfare state retrenchment: it was argued that
16 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets. The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 16–18.
17 E.g., Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle.
18 David Bradley, Evelyne Huber, Stephanie Moller, Franc¸ois Nielsen and John D. Stephens,
‘Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies’, World Politics, 55 (2003), 193–228;
Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Parties and Policies in
Global Markets (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001); Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the
Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Alexander M. Hicks and Duane Swank,
‘Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960–1982’, American
Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 658–74; Pablo Beramendi and David Rueda, ‘Social Democracy
Constrained: Indirect Taxation in Industrialized Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 37
(2007), 619–41; Vicki Birchﬁeld and Markus M. L. Crepaz, ‘The Impact of Constitutional Structures and
Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized Democracies’, European
Journal of Political Research, 34 (1998), 175–200.
19 Jonas Pontusson and David Rueda, ‘Inequality as a Source of Political Polarization’, in Pablo
Beramendi and Christopher Anderson, eds, Democracy, Inequality, and Representation: A Comparative
Perspective (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008), pp. 127–68.
20 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), p. 293.
21 Korpi, ‘Power Politics and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship’. It must also
be noted that later contributions, such as the one by van Kersbergen, have qualiﬁed this all too
straightforward link between low income, working-class voters and left-wing parties, by showing that
during the post-war era, the parties of the left did not represent the entire working class in continental
Europe, because a substantial part of the working class was mobilized by Christian democratic, rather
than social democratic parties. See Kees Van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian
Democracy and the Welfare State (London: Routledge, 1995). We point out the implications of this
observation in more detail in our discussion of party competition below.
22 Francis G. Castles, ed., The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States
(London: Sage, 1982); Manfred G. Schmidt, ‘When Parties Matter: A Review of the Possibilities and
Limits of Partisan Inﬂuence on Public Policy’, European Journal of Political Research, 30 (1996), 155–83.
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left parties stand for less cuts in the realm of social policy, because they represent the
beneﬁciaries of the welfare state and sustain a pro-welfare ideology.23 All these studies
share the basic assumptions regarding left parties, their voters and policy preferences: the
working class is the main constituency of the left, it holds strong preferences for
redistribution and social insurance, and – consequently – the left ﬁghts for welfare state
expansion in the democratic class struggle.
‘NEW SCHOOL’: POST-INDUSTRIAL ELECTORATES, CONTEXT AND PARTY–VOTER
LINKAGES
Over the past ten years, an increasing number of studies have shown that party politics
often shapes social policy in ways that differ from the hypotheses and mechanisms implied
by traditional partisan politics theory. In the following, we group these studies according
to the argument that sets them apart from traditional theory: ﬁrstly, the electoral
constituencies of parties have changed; secondly, electoral institutions, party systems and
interaction between parties matter for explaining social policy reforms; thirdly, different
kinds of linkages between parties and their voters shape policy making. With these three
strands of research, we discuss a range of alternative approaches to the study of partisan
politics and the welfare state, which do not refer to each other explicitly, even though they
share a common objective in rethinking the role of parties in welfare policy development.
We argue that they can and should be brought together in order to gain a better
understanding of party politics and social policy. We discuss each of them in turn.
Changing Electoral Constituencies: What Parties Do Depends on Who They
Represent
The traditional partisan politics literature on the welfare state sees political parties as the
key actors in the ‘democratic class struggle’, a concept that stresses the representative
function of parties.24 Studies in the tradition of power resource theory have shown that
left-wing parties were a driving force of welfare state expansion and assumed that the
reason for this was to be found in the working-class interests the left represented. Most of
the more recent literature on social policy making since the 1980s still shares that same
assumption. However, none of the major studies in the partisan politics tradition actually
tests the electoral foundations of the political parties.25 Rather, they postulate that the left
still represents the same ‘working-class interests’ of redistributive collectivism as it did in
the era of welfare state growth. In the light of this assumption on electoral constituencies,
they interpret their empirical results: studies that ﬁnd a positive impact of left-wing power
on redistribution and welfare generosity take this as evidence that the model with all its
underlying assumptions still holds: welfare politics is still the same democratic class
23 James P. Allan and Lyle Scruggs, ‘Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced
Industrial Societies’, American Journal of Political Science, 48 (2004), 496–512; Walter Korpi and Joakim
Palme, ‘New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State
Regress in 18 Countries, 1975–95’, American Political Science Review, 97 (2003), 425–46.
24 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1960).
25 E.g., Allan and Scruggs, ‘Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial
Societies’; Huber and Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State; Bradley et al., ‘Distribution
and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies’; Iversen and Soskice, ‘Electoral Institutions and the
Politics of Coalitions’; Beramendi and Rueda, ‘Social Democracy Constrained’.
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struggle it was ﬁfty years ago.26 Many studies indeed do still ﬁnd such an effect, but the
explanatory power of the ‘left party variable’ has become weaker.27 This weakening is
seen as evidence that parties matter less, and that their programmatic differences are
increasingly constrained and narrowed by exogenous forces, such as globalization or ﬁscal
constraints. Finally, studies that point to the absence of party differences or ‘unexpected’
party behaviour (such as left-wing parties cutting back on welfare or different left-wing
and right-wing governments pursuing very similar social policy agendas) interpret this as
evidence for a loosening link between parties and their electorates,28 or even a ‘hollowing’
of the representative function of parties.29 In short, if left-wing parties do not defend the
‘old’ welfare state and push for more redistribution, and if right-wing parties do not push
for less state intervention and redistribution, this is interpreted as evidence that parties’
policy strategies are not driven by the interests of their core electorates anymore. This
may be a reasonable argument, but it rests entirely on the – untested – assumption that
the electoral patterns have remained stable.
Such an assumption is obviously problematic because there is ample reason to believe
that electorates and voter interests have changed profoundly over recent decades. There
is a wide literature on party systems, which shows just how much social structure
and electoral behaviour have evolved since the 1970s, entailing a range of electoral
dealignments and realignments.30 This literature, however, is almost completely ignored
by welfare state scholars. The study of electoral change implies that parties may very well
still be ‘programmatic organizations with well-developed ties to particular social
groups’,31 but that we need to re-conceptualize who these particular social groups are.
Once we get to a more adequate conceptualization of electoral constituencies, partisan
politics variables may explain just as much of social policy development as they did in the
heyday of power resource theory.
There are two distinct sides to the argument that recent electoral change needs to be
taken into account, one relating to shifts in the electorate (i.e. the same parties today
mobilize different social groups than two or three decades ago) and a second relating to
26 Allan and Scruggs, ‘Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial
Societies’; Bradley et al., ‘Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies’; Iversen and
Soskice, ‘Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions’; Beramendi and Rueda, ‘Social Democracy
Constrained’.
27 Huber and Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State.
28 E.g., Kitschelt, ‘Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment’; Levy, ‘Vice into Virtue?’;
Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State.
29 Peter Mair, ‘Ruling the Void? The Hollowing of Western Democracies’, New Left Review, 42 (2004),
25–51; Mark Blyth and Jonathan Hopkin, ‘Cartel Parties and Cartel Policies in Advanced Democracies:
Explaining Why Partisan Elites Collude or Compete’ (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Seattle, 2011).
30 E.g., Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck, eds, Electoral Change in Advanced
Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984);
Mark N. Franklin, Thomas T. Mackie and Henry Valen, eds, Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving
Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992);
Geoffrey Evans, ed., The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999); Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy; Hanspeter Kriesi
et al., West European Politics in the Age of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008);
Silja Ha¨usermann and Hanspeter Kriesi, ‘What Do Voters Want? Dimensions and Conﬁgurations in
Individual-Level Preferences and Party Choice’ (paper presented at the Conference on the Future of
Democratic Capitalism, Zurich, 2011).
31 Pontusson and Rueda, ‘Inequality as a Source of Political Polarization’, p. 317.
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shifts in preferences (i.e. even if parties still mobilize their voters in the same socio-structural
groups, these ‘traditional voters’ may have changed preferences).
The argument on electoral shifts mostly refers to the fact that left-wing parties
increasingly attract highly skilled middle-class voters.32 Different left-wing parties (social-
democratic parties, green parties, radical left parties) have mobilized a new electorate of
younger, highly educated and strongly libertarian voters, many of them women. The shift
of these middle-class voters to the left is driven by cultural, rather than economic
factors.33 However, some authors argue that it nonetheless has profound implications
for distributive partisan politics.34 Highly skilled women working in the service sector,
as an example of typical ‘new left’ voters, obviously incur different social risks and
have different social preferences from the average male production worker. They
demand social policies linked to education, social investment, universalism and gender
equality. By contrast, they have less interest in traditional redistributive schemes (because
they are highly skilled and thus have high earnings-power in the market). This implies
that to the extent that left-wing parties rely on this ‘new’ electorate, we should expect a
more market-liberal social investment agenda, rather than a traditional redistributive
policy agenda.
The second development concerns ‘traditional constituencies’ changing their policy
preferences. This argument deals with working-class interests. Workers and low-income
voters increasingly adhere to traditionalist and anti-immigration stances. Several studies
show that these issues have gained saliency among the working-class voters, even leading
some of them to abandon the left for the populist right.35 This growing threat of electoral
loss obviously has implications for the social policy agenda of the left-wing parties,
driving it potentially in a more welfare chauvinist direction.
Changing working-class interests, however, are not conﬁned to new cultural orientations.
With regard to economic and welfare preferences, a growing literature shows that the
‘working class’ today is divided into at least two groups: insiders and outsiders.36 The
insider–outsider distinction refers to a divide ‘between a shrinking, largely male core of secure
and privileged employees, and a mass of more or less chronically unemployed and
marginalized populations’,37 which differ with regard to their social needs and their
preferences. Different authors have developed distinct hypotheses as to how this divide is
mobilized in the party political realm. Rueda and King are so far the clearest voices in this
debate.38 They argue (but do not test empirically) that labour-market insiders continue to vote
32 Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy.
33 It originates in the emergence of a new cultural divide in the middle class that opposes advocates of
libertarian values to supporters of more traditionalist values. See Kitschelt, The Transformation of
European Social Democracy; Hanspeter Kriesi, ‘The Transformation of Cleavage Politics: The 1997 Stein
Rokkan Lecture’, European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998), 165–85.
34 Ha¨usermann, The Politics of Welfare State Reform in Continental Europe; Kitschelt and Rehm,
‘Work, Family and Politics’.
35 E.g., Simon Bornschier, Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conﬂict in
Western Europe (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010); Kriesi et al., West European Politics in the
Age of Globalization.
36 David Rueda, ‘Insider–Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social
Democratic Parties’, American Political Science Review, 99 (2005), 61–74; Rueda, Social Democracy Inside
Out.
37 Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies, p. 294.
38 King and Rueda, ‘Cheap Labor’; Rueda, ‘Insider–Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies’;
Rueda, Social Democracy Inside Out.
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for social-democratic parties, while outsiders either abstain from voting or vote for radical
right parties. If that was true, we would expect left-wing parties to defend the status quo of
insider-protection (mainly through social insurance policies), rather than pushing for more
outsider-oriented policies (such as needs-based minimum protection, social investment and
universal beneﬁts). In contrast, Ha¨usermann and Walter have analysed the electoral
reconﬁguration and constituency preferences empirically for Switzerland, showing that it is
actually the old insider working class whose party preferences shift to the right, in defence of
the status quo and welfare chauvinism.39 Outsiders, by contrast, either abstain from voting or
vote for left parties that advocate more universal and needs-based social policies. This implies
that we should expect the radical right to defend the welfare status quo, while those parties of
the left (be they green, social-democratic or radical left parties) that attract the outsider-votes
should advocate a universalist and redistributive agenda.
In sum, studies on underlying electoral shifts show that we need to update our assumptions
regarding the interests parties actually represent. Only if we formulate expected party policies
based on their current and empirically established electoral basis can we test whether parties
still fulﬁl their representative functions or not. Just because parties ‘do different things’ from
what they did thirty years ago does not mean they do not represent their voters. Parties may
defend different policies simply because they represent different social groups.
Context: What Parties Do Depends on Institutions and Party Competition
In the traditional partisan politics approach the goals and policy choices of a party
depend on the ideological ‘family’ it belongs to, which is ultimately a function of its social
class constituency. Such a close link between preferences of party voters and policy
preferences of parties is also unquestioned in the aforementioned contributions, which
study the transformation of these constituencies. Both approaches are largely blind to the
way in which the preferences and actions of a party may be conditional on the
institutional and partisan environment. However, a range of recent works highlights such
contextual determinants, thus potentially overturning the assumptions that guide the
traditional partisan politics approach.
With regard to institutions, a growing literature analyses the links between electoral
rules, partisan preferences and partisan effects. Iversen and Soskice have argued that left-
party governments and, therefore, high levels of redistribution are less likely in
majoritarian electoral systems than under proportional representation (PR), because
the median voter in a two-party system has a rational incentive to vote for the right, whereas
the multiparty system that is typical of PR allows for pro-redistribution coalitions of middle-
class and lower-class parties.40 In a similar vein, Jusko and also Rodden explain how the
electoral rules and the geographical distribution of low-income voters condition electoral
mobilization strategies and – ultimately – the power of left parties.41 This is an important
complement to the partisan politics approach because it shows that two left parties operating
39 Silja Ha¨usermann and Stefanie Walter, ‘Restructuring Swiss Welfare Politics: Post-Industrial Labor
Markets, Globalization and Attitudes Towards Social Policies’, in Simon Hug and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds,
Value Change in Switzerland, Restructuring Swiss Welfare Politics (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books,
2010), pp. 143–68.
40 Iversen and Soskice, ‘Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions’.
41 Karen Long Jusko, ‘The Electoral Foundations of Poverty Relief in Contemporary Democratic
Societies’ (working paper, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2009); Jonathan Rodden,
‘The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences’, Annual Review of Political Science, 13 (2010), 321–40.
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under different electoral rules may differ in their effect on welfare policies. However, some of
these studies do not question the basic assumption regarding policy preferences of left- and
right-wing parties, i.e. they still assume that left-wing parties represent the low-income classes
and, consequently, promote more redistribution. In that sense, institutions do not alter
partisan preferences, they rather condition power relations. Recent work by Ansell, however,
takes the institutionalist argument one decisive step further.42 Ansell contends that the actual
preferences of parties (not only their relative power) depend on the institutional context, in
this case the institutions of the welfare state itself. He shows that whether left parties favour
or contest the allocation of resources to higher education depends on the structure of the
higher education system (mass v. elite system) in a country. In a mass university system, left
parties favour increased spending on tertiary education, because it has a redistributive effect,
whereas they contest it in an elite-system that entails a regressive effect. Taking this result
seriously means that we cannot simply compare spending preferences across countries
because these preferences take a different meaning depending on the institutional context.
The implication is that policy preferences of left-wing and right-wing parties cannot be
assumed easily, but need to be contextualized.
The second main contextual factor inﬂuencing partisan politics is the party system itself.
In this respect, we can distinguish between studies that focus – more statically – on the
consequences of party system structures (in particular, in terms of cleavages), and those
that focus on the dynamics of party competition that are generated by different spatial
conﬁgurations of party systems.
The ‘old school’ approach presupposes a party system that offers a simple choice
between left and right on social and economic issues. The party system most compatible
with this perspective is, of course, a two-party system (such as the American or the
[former] British party system).43 In case of multi-party systems, the analogy would imply
that all parties can be allocated to only two camps (forming a bipolar party system), each
constituting alternative government options and the main dimension of competition being
socio-economic policies. In the terminology of Lipset and Rokkan, these are party
systems with one cleavage only: the capital–labour conﬂict.44
However, some authors have stressed that secondary cleavages in addition to
capital–labour have shaped welfare state development. In Continental Europe, in addition
to social-democratic parties, Christian democratic parties – arising from the state–church
cleavage – are strong and have had a large inﬂuence in welfare state expansion. This distinct
role of Christian democratic parties was stressed early on by van Kersbergen.45 In Nordic
countries, the urban–rural cleavage has found expression in agrarian parties, which supported
and shaped the construction of generous welfare states that was otherwise advanced by
social-democratic parties.46 In a more general vein, Ferrera has shown that the presence of
ethnic, linguistic or religious cleavages, as well as ideological polarization, impedes the
42 Ben W. Ansell, ‘University Challenger: Explaining Institutional Change in Higher Education’,World
Politics, 60 (2008), 189–230.
43 See Hibbs, ‘Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy’.
44 Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments:
An Introduction’, in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, Party Systems and Voter Alignments:
Cross-National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 1–67.
45 Van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism.
46 Philip Manow, ‘Electoral Rules, Class Coalitions and Welfare State Regimes, or How to Explain
Esping-Andersen with Stein Rokkan’, Socio-Economic Review, 7 (2009), 101–21; Philip Manow and Kees
van Kersbergen, Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States (New York: Cambridge University Press,
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introduction of universalistic policies and favours fragmented and occupationally deﬁned
programmes.47 This view is corroborated byWatson who highlights how a division within the
left leads to a struggle for dominance between left-wing parties, in which social policy is used
in strategic and targeted ways, impeding encompassing policy solutions.48
Other scholars have looked at the different competition dynamics created by various
party system conﬁgurations. Here, we can distinguish one view that regards party
competition rather as an intervening variable, potentially constraining the feasible courses
of action of government parties, and another view, which takes party competition as a
more fundamental driving factor of parties’ policy preferences. The ﬁrst perspective has
been applied to welfare retrenchment by Kitschelt.49 He argues that left-wing competition
can hinder – and right-wing competition can facilitate – government decisions to cut back
welfare entitlements. In addition, the ability of parties to adopt retrenchment depends on
the characteristics of the competitors, such as programmatic credibility or organizational
ﬂexibility, and on the salience of socio-economic issues. Kitschelt does not really discuss
why parties pursue retrenchment in the ﬁrst place. But in pursuing this goal they are
constrained to varying degrees by party competition.
The second, more fundamental, perspective on party competition holds that social
policy making is driven essentially by strategic considerations, which depend on the
positioning of parties in political space. According to Picot, policies are often used to
appeal to important groups of voters, rather than pursuing long-standing ideological
policy programmes.50 Who the decisive groups of voters are depends on the spatial
conﬁguration of the party system. Green-Pedersen applies a similar reasoning to the
parliamentary arena and to the parties’ goal of entering government coalitions.51 Parties
may adjust their position on social policy issues to the position of a potential coalition
partner if that partner is pivotal for forming a coalition. This strategic understanding of
party competition departs more clearly from the traditional perspective on partisan
politics. In the traditional – bottom-up – approach, parties are the agents of a social class.
The strategic view of party competition, by contrast, sees parties as resourceful
organizations that are partially autonomous from social structures and – in a top-down
manner – deploy social policy to mobilize electoral support. This view is rooted in and
supported by the literature on party organizations, which argues that parties used to have
a closer connection to their electorate in the past, but are more autonomous today.52
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47 Ferrera, Modelli Di Solidarieta`; see also Maurizio Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare: European
Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),
pp. 65–86.
48 Sara Watson, ‘The Left Divided: Parties, Unions and the Resolution of Southern Spain’s Agrarian
Question’, Politics & Society, 36 (2008), 451–77.
49 Kitschelt, ‘Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment’.
50 Georg Picot, ‘Party Competition and Reforms of Unemployment Beneﬁts in Germany: How a Small
Change in Electoral Demand Can Make a Big Difference’, German Politics, 18 (2009), 155–79; Picot,
Politics of Segmentation.
51 Green-Pedersen, ‘Welfare State Retrenchment in Denmark and the Netherlands’; Christoffer Green-
Pedersen, The Politics of Justiﬁcation: Party Competition and Welfare-State Retrenchment in Denmark and
the Netherlands from 1982 to 1998 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002).
52 E.g. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party
Organizations in Western Democracies (London: Sage, 1994); Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, ‘Changing
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Traditional partisan politics theory is based on the model of the socialist mass party that
grew out of the labour movement. This type of party did indeed have a clearly deﬁned
constituency and was connected to it by close organizational ties. However, it is argued
that, since the Second World War, the organizational model of the mass party has been
largely superseded by the catch-all party, which has deliberately tried to broaden its electoral
basis. Some go even further, suggesting that since the 1970s the catch-all party is being
replaced by the cartel party, which has even looser electoral ties and is more strongly
incorporated into the state.53 In any case, the changes in party organization indicate that
political parties have become less dependent on their historical core voters and thus strategic
electoral considerations may have become more relevant for policy decisions.54
Overall, the studies discussed in this section show that in order to hypothesize a party’s
policy preferences, it is not enough to know whether it is left or right. Rather, we need to
study the context in which the party operates. Electoral institutions condition the way
parties come to power, policy institutions inﬂuence their policy preferences, cleavages
structure the political terrain and coalition-formation, and the spatial conﬁguration of
party competition constrains or shapes policy choices in the light of electoral trade-offs.
Party–Voter Linkages: What Parties Do Depends on How They Relate to Voters
The relation between parties and their voters, i.e. party–electorate linkages, can be based
on programmatic considerations, on material-particularistic motives, or on socio-cultural
ties. In other words, voters may choose a party because they are genuinely convinced of
the policies it proposes, because they expect to get a direct beneﬁt in return for their vote,
or because they identify with this party due to their social and cultural background.55
The traditional partisan politics approach has not conceptualized party–electorate
linkages explicitly. Most common is the perspective that sees parties and their voters
attached to a broad ideology.56 Parties are supposed to promote a certain policy
programme (such as generous and universal social beneﬁts in the case of social-
democratic parties), which represents the preferences of their voters. Hence, politics is
seen in programmatic rather than particularistic or cultural terms.
In contrast to this programmatic perspective, some researchers have stressed that
social policy is sometimes shaped by the particularistic motives of parties. This has
been indicated early on in national welfare state literatures, such as those on Italy,
(F’note continued)
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55 Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds, Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic
Accountability and Political Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Arturo Parisi
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Greece and Japan.57 In a comparative perspective, the study by Orloff and Skocpol on
early social policy development in the United States and the United Kingdom was
inﬂuential.58 Drawing on Shefter’s work on state building and party patronage,59 they
show how a lack of administrative autonomy in the United States facilitated clientelist
abuse of social programmes in the late nineteenth century. The existence of these
clientelist relations in turn kept progressive politicians from demanding social policy
expansion, as they feared that new social measures would be hijacked for clientelist
purposes as well. Therefore, if particularistic party–electorate linkages prevail, this can
have effects even on the policy stance of programmatically minded politicians.
In spite of these early studies, the effects of particularistic party–electorate linkages on
social policy have not been more widely recognized on the comparative level until
recently. Lynch’s widely cited book published in 2006 has shown how particularistic
linkage strategies play a role at important junctures of welfare state development. In
particular, they can keep governments in occupation-based welfare states from adopting
citizenship-based policies. Lynch explains: ‘Occupationally based social insurance
programmes plainly lend themselves far more than do universal programmes to the
kind of ﬁne-grained targeting of incentives on which particularistic political competition
thrives’.60 Moreover, particularistic political actors will not promote the development of
neutral state capacities as these could put at risk their particularistic strategies. However,
universal policies cannot be implemented without adequate state capacity. Consequently,
even programmatically oriented politicians refrain from promoting universalist schemes
in the context of a weak state.
Este´vez-Abe’s book on the Japanese welfare state takes the linkage argument a step
further by exploring the institutional incentives for different linkage strategies.61
According to her, the degree to which parties adopt targeted or universalistic policies
depends on the electoral system. Electoral rules determine electoral strategies and,
consequently, the policy choices of parties and politicians. The district magnitude and the
importance of the personal vote are two crucial parameters. In multi-member districts,
electoral competition revolves mainly around organized groups of voters and, therefore,
narrower interests. The personal vote, in turn, provides individual candidates with
incentives to make particularistic policy choices. Hence, in Este´vez-Abe’s model the
particularistic or programmatic relation between parties and voters is not itself the
independent variable but is part of the causal mechanism that links electoral rules and
targeted versus universalistic policies.
The crucial insight that we can gain from the literature on party–electorate linkages is
that – in contrast to the programmatic bias in partisan theory – the electoral strategies of
parties may as well be particularistic. Parties sometimes adopt narrowly deﬁned policies in
57 Ugo Ascoli, ed., Welfare State All’italiana (Bari: Laterza, 1984); Maurizio Ferrera, Il Welfare State
in Italia: Sviluppo E Crisi in Prospettiva Comparata (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984); Maurizio Ferrera, ‘The
Southern Model of Welfare in Social Europe’, Journal of European Social Policy, 6 (1996), 17–37; Maria
Petmesidou, ‘Social Protection in Greece: A Brief Glimpse of a Welfare State’, Social Policy &
Administration, 30 (1996), 324–47; Kent E. Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political
Stability in Japan, 1949–1986 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
58 Orloff and Skocpol, ‘Why Not Equal Protection?’; see also Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers.
59 Martin Shefter, ‘Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy’, Politics & Society, 7 (1977),
403–51.
60 Lynch, Age in the Welfare State, p. 65.
61 Este´vez-Abe, Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan.
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order to attract speciﬁc groups of voters. If particularism prevails, it can keep even
parties, which are commonly held to be programmatic, from promoting universal policy
solutions. Conditions favouring particularism are, among others, low autonomy of state
bureaucracy and speciﬁc electoral rules. Under these conditions it is unwarranted to work
with hypotheses that are based on broad ideological families, assuming programmatic
coherence. Rather, we would have to expect fragmented policies that are targeted towards
whichever electoral group is central for gaining or retaining power.
DISCUSSION: BETWEEN UPDATING AND REVISING
The main general lesson, which can be drawn from the three strands of research we have
discussed above is that the traditional partisan politics approach applies to a more limited
set of empirical cases than previously thought. For all cases that do not meet the basic
assumptions of the traditional approach, the theory of partisan politics needs to be
adapted, either by updating some of the underlying assumptions, or by re-conceptualizing
the approach more fundamentally. In this last part of our discussion, therefore, we start
by proposing scope conditions for traditional partisan theory. Scope conditions specify
the empirical conditions under which we expect a theory to hold. Then we go on to discuss
the implications of the three strands of research, presented above, for further research.
Hence, we address the question: if one or several of the scope conditions do not apply,
how should we analyse the relation between party politics and the welfare state?
Each of the three strands of research, outlined in the previous section, can be read in
terms of scope conditions for traditional partisan politics theory. The claim that we need
to ‘update’ the electoral landscape which drives party politics (the ﬁrst new approach
discussed in this article) is a more moderate critique of the traditional approach because it
does not question the representative link between the interests of the electorate and the
policy preferences of political parties. Still, it has rather clear implications for the
applicability of the traditional approach: the more the social structure and electoral
landscape have shifted from an industrial to a post-industrial pattern, the less the
traditional assumptions on the nature of represented interests hold. The second strand of
research, highlighting contextual inﬂuences, contains a much more fundamental critique
of the traditional approach: it holds that it is always necessary to take the structure of the
party system and the institutional context into account, not just in speciﬁc historical
circumstances. However, even here the issue can be rephrased in terms of scope conditions.
Bipolar party systems that are mainly structured by the socio-economic cleavage come closest
to the uni-dimensional structure of party competition the traditional partisan politics
approach has in mind. Finally, a theorization of party–voter linkages also implies an
important scope condition: where parties use policies as concrete objects in exchange for
particular votes, approaches relying on ideological party families fall short.
In sum, the combined scope conditions are the following: an industrial social and
electoral structure, a bipolar party system, and programmatic party–voter linkages. As an
illustrative example, one could mention Britain during the ﬁrst three post-war decades as
meeting the scope conditions of traditional partisan theory. With Labour and the
Conservatives its party system offered clear choices on the left and the right that were
primarily distinguished by their positions on social and economic issues. The way they
competed was prevailingly programmatic. And although post-industrialization set in
early in Britain, the social structure was still largely deﬁned in terms of industrial classes.
Otherwise, examples of ‘pure’ two-party, programmatic, industrially structured partisan
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politics are hard to ﬁnd. The United States, for instance, meets the two-party system
condition. But even when the United States had an industrial social structure, it did not
translate into class politics to the extent that this was the case in Europe and
particularistic party–electorate linkages have always been strong. On the other side of the
spectrum, an example that clearly does not meet the scope conditions of traditional
partisan theory would be the First Republic in Italy (1948–93). It had a tripolar party
system (centre, far left and far right) with a divided left and a strong religious cleavage,
and particularistic competition was pervasive.
The most general and far-reaching obstacle to the adequacy of a simple version of the
partisan politics theory today is arguably post-industrialization. In all advanced capitalist
countries, tertiary employment today clearly outnumbers industrial employment, which
violates the scope condition of an industrial social structure. To the extent that new
parties (such as Green and right-wing populist parties) arise in order to meet new
interests, post-industrialization also transforms the party system and party competition in
ways that do not conform to traditional theory, by shifting politics from a uni-
dimensional to a multi-dimensional conﬂict space.62 Moreover, parties have adapted their
organizations and have become more ﬂexible in their electoral strategies.63 In the light of
these pervasive challenges, we would like to use the remainder of this article to discuss
concretely how we might adapt our theory and research if one or several of the scope
conditions for the traditional partisan politics approach are not met. Every theory of
partisan welfare politics implies hypotheses on the preferred policies of particular parties.
All three strands of the new school of research we discussed, identify factors that drive
parties’ policy preferences in a way or in directions that differ from what we would expect
following the traditional approach. Hence, taking them seriously means that we have to
adapt our ideas and hypotheses of what parties want.
The ﬁrst strand of research discussed in this article argues that electoral constituencies
of political parties have changed in the wake of post-industrialization. Since it does not
question the bottom-up chain of interest representation by political parties, this claim is to
a large extent compatible with the underlying assumptions of the traditional approach,
but it requires that we update its very foundation: the traditional partisan politics approach
assumes that parties represent a class structure that dates back to the age of industrialization
and post-war growth. Post-industrialization has brought changes in the class structure and
thereby changes of voter preferences with regard to parties and policies.64 Hence, while
parties’ policy preferences might still be driven by their voter constituencies, we need to adapt
our expectations of what parties want to what their current constituencies want. Empirically,
this ‘updating’ can take place at the micro or the macro level.
At the micro level, studies integrating individual-level analysis of policy and party
preferences in the study of party effects can be seen as a step in the right direction, since
they set out actually to observe voters’ policy preferences empirically, rather than
assuming them theoretically. Contributions such as those by Cusack, Iversen and Rehm,
Rehm, or Rueda all study the preferences of post-industrial risk groups for particular
62 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1990); Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy; Kriesi et al., West European
Politics in the Age of Globalization.
63 Katz and Mair, ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy’.
64 Daniel Oesch, Redrawing the Class Map: Stratiﬁcation and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden
and Switzerland (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
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policies, before linking them to what parties and governments actually do.65 However,
taking this approach seriously implies that we need to observe both policy and party
preferences of different post-industrial electoral potentials empirically, since both may
have altered.66 We can then hypothesize what parties with a particular proﬁle of voters
and voter preferences are likely to advocate in terms of welfare policy. Including this in
our studies can also yield new insights on how parties prioritize the different demands of
their heterogeneous (class-) constituencies,67 or how they use this heterogeneity of
constituencies when engaging in political exchange.68
It is true that large-N macro comparisons may encounter difﬁculties controlling for
such changing electorates, since the extent and structure of electoral reconﬁgurations
varies across countries and cannot easily be generalized and integrated in the standard
variables. However, the electoral shifts this literature is concerned with are not random:
based on (secondary) studies of electoral dynamics, it may be possible to replace the old
variables (such as ‘left-wing party power’ and similar variables) directly with more
meaningful variables. For instance, we know by now that we need to distinguish between
‘old left’ and ‘new left’ parties (i.e. between those with a more ‘workerist’ versus those
with a more middle-class proﬁle). Hence a simple ‘left power’ variable does not make
much sense anymore. We also need to distinguish between radical and moderate right-
wing parties’ impact because they mobilize very different segments of the society.
Basically, the shifting electoral foundations of post-industrial party systems require us to
re-classify parties into new party families, such as workerist left, middle-class left, green
parties, etc. Parties may still have the same names as thirty or forty years ago, but that
may not tell us much about their voter proﬁle anymore.69
Theoretical approaches that emphasize the importance of party competition require a
more radical rethinking of the functioning of party politics: while the traditional
approach sees party politics as driven by social constituencies and their interests, party
competition approaches focus on the relative autonomy of parties as organizations and
the independent logic of the interaction between parties. A strong version of the
competition argument assumes parties to be mainly focused on ‘contested’ constituencies.
Freed from socially structured voter–party links, parties strive to take the ideal policy
position that ﬁts the mood of the public, while taking account of the positions of other
parties. The objective is to maximize votes and/or ofﬁce and the way to get there depends
always on the actions of the other parties. This differs starkly from the socially grounded
65 Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen and Philipp Rehm, ‘Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides
of Government Redistribution’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22 (2006), 365–89; Philipp Rehm,
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logic of the traditional approach. Instead, parties’ policy preferences become strategic,
opportunistic and do not remain static as in old school theory. Hence, in this radical
form, the highly volatile policy preferences of parties depend on electoral strategies and
the speciﬁc conﬁgurations of party systems. Therefore, this argument is hard to integrate
into large-N research designs.
A somewhat softer version of the party competition approach builds on the traditional
assumption regarding the socially structured voter–party link, but then adds a competitive
element. Parties may have distinct social constituencies, but they opt for only one of them
when the others are electorally less important.70 The party’s strategy changes, but only by
narrowing its policy focus down to a subset of its entire constituency. In such a ‘softer’
version of the competition argument, competition may also enter the analysis as a
constraining factor: the orientation of a party can be determined by its social constituency (in
line with the traditional or updated assumption), but the extent to which this goal is actively
pursued, i.e. the policy choice, is limited by party competition.71 Thus, if social democrats
have to compete with a more radical party to their left, we expect them to advocate more left-
wing policies than if they compete only with a centrist or right-wing party. Empirically, such
conditional effects can be integrated in regression analysis by means of interaction effects in
order to test whether, for example, the impact of social democracy is different when it
competes with a more radical left-wing rival party. In that sense, one would be able to capture
both the direct and the conditional effect, combining the party competition perspective with
the electoral constituency perspective.
Traditional partisan theory assumes that class is the most relevant cleavage in society, if
not the only one. Cleavage-based arguments, however, stress that additional cleavages
shape parties’ identities and policy priorities. Consequently, two features of party systems
should be considered: ﬁrst, and similar to the ‘competition-as-constraint’ argument, we need
to take into account the ideological polarization that goes along with a divided left (such as in
France, Italy and Spain) or a divided right (for example, Austria, France and Norway).
Secondly, we need to take into account the importance of cultural cleavages that cut across
the capital–labour cleavage (as in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland) and introduce
non-economic, cultural motivations into the politico-economic sphere. Both versions of
cleavage-based considerations change the expected orientations and strategies of parties:
through polarization and fractionalization of the party system, parties arguably become
representatives of more speciﬁc groups, so that we would expect their policy preferences to be
narrower. This can be integrated in empirical research by using common indicators of party
system polarization and fragmentation. However, taking the relevance of non-economic,
cultural cleavages in the party system seriously has more consequential implications, since it
means that parties’ positions on social and economic policies are not only shaped by their
voters’ material interests, but also by cultural values regarding distributive issues. Christian
democratic parties, for instance, might advocate poor relief or social insurance for religious
reasons, rather than in response to the economic interests of their voters. Similarly, parties of
the radical right may defend the welfare state for reasons of national identity. Such factors
challenge the traditional partisan politics approach by requiring a careful contextualization of
the national policy debates and political processes.
70 E.g., Rueda, Social Democracy Inside Out.
71 E.g., Reimut Zohlnho¨fer, ‘Parteien, Vetospieler Und Der Wettbewerb Um Wa¨hlerstimmen: Die
Arbeitsmarkt-Und Bescha¨ftigungspolitik Der A¨ra Kohl’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 42 (2001),
655–82.
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Finally, the literature on programmatic v. particularistic party–voter linkages claims
that the traditional partisan politics theory only applies when parties mobilize their voters
with programmatic appeals. Politics based fully on particularistic voter–party links
cannot be analysed with the traditional approach, because the orientations and strategies
of political parties change to such an extent that party labels such as ‘left’ and ‘right’ make
no sense. However, as in the case of the party competition argument, the two approaches
can be made compatible. One way is to redeﬁne the dependent variable. Lynch, for
example, expects particularistic party competition to lead to fragmented social policies
and to sustain occupational principles of welfare coverage.72 Therefore, the dependent
variable does not consist of the usual social spending or beneﬁt generosity measures.73
Similarly, we can control for the degree of particularism by using a gradual measure, for
example with expert survey data that provides information on clientelistic practices of
different parties in particular countries.74
A more indirect way of adapting the traditional approach to the insights of studies on
programmatic and clientelistic competition is to trace the origins of different kinds of
linkages back to institutional causes. Este´vez-Abe’s argument that multi-member
electoral districts and the personal vote in Japan led parties to focus on narrow interest
groups is a case in point.75 It implies that vote fragmentation leads to more particularistic
policies, and thus uses institutional variables to control for the type of linkages that
prevail in a system. Similarly, we may account for the degree of state autonomy, which
determines to what extent parties and politicians can inﬂuence the assignment of welfare
beneﬁts for particularistic electoral motives.76 Overall, taking different linkages into
account (either directly or by focusing on their causes) should make us aware that these
are different strategies from those which the partisan approach assumes. And these
strategies imply different (more fragmented) orientations and policy choices.
Table 1 provides a brief overview of the arguments and implications developed in this
article. Our discussion of possible strategies to deal empirically with the theoretical challenges
raised in much of the recent literature is not and cannot be exhaustive, since research in this
area is just starting to grow. However, it is intended to provide a systematization of the
problems we are dealing with and of possible strategies to solve them.
The new theoretical approaches, in particular the second (party competition) and third
(party–electorate linkages) are hardly compatible with traditional partisan politics theory if
we focus on their more radical implications. However, all of them can be adapted to or even
combined with the traditional approach and doing so leads to important insights into
the complex interplay of party politics and welfare state development, as shown by the
numerous works cited in this review. Even more importantly, when these approaches are
combined with the traditional partisan politics approach, intriguing research questions
emerge: do parties act as representatives of social constituencies or is party politics best
described as a semi-autonomous and strategic elite behaviour? How much do cultural values
(religion or post-materialism) leave their footprint on social policy making? When do
72 Lynch, Age in the Welfare State.
73 Redeﬁnitions of the dependent variable in terms of fragmentation v. universalism can be found also
in the research strand focusing on party competition: Ferrera, Modelli Di Solidarieta`; Picot, Politics of
Segmentation.
74 See, e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson, Patrons, Clients, and Policies.
75 Este´vez-Abe, Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan.
76 Orloff and Skocpol, ‘Why Not Equal Protection?’
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politicians opt for different linkage strategies? And how do parties integrate or exclude
preferences of their heterogeneous electorate?
CONCLUSION: A ‘NEW SCHOOL’ OF PARTISAN POLITICS THEORY WITH ‘OLD
SCHOOL’ ROOTS
Partisan politics has been a powerful approach in comparative welfare state research and has
contributed signiﬁcantly to our understanding of the expansion of welfare states and the
emergence of different welfare regimes. However, the rising tide of studies indicating different
ways in which party politics inﬂuences social policy development shows that traditional
partisan theory needs to be reconsidered. In this article, we have discussed three strands
of theorizing and research, which point to different ‘deviations’ from the assumptions
of traditional partisan theory. A ﬁrst strand of research argues that post-industrial socio-
structural change has altered the electoral constituencies of parties, so expecting them still to
be advocating the same policies as in the industrial age is unwarranted. A second strand
maintains that what parties want depends on the context of party competition and (electoral)
institutions with which they are confronted. Hence, we cannot theorize about the impact of
TABLE 1 Different Theoretical Approaches to Partisan Welfare Politics and Their
Implications
Approach Argument
Implications for empirical
research
Traditional partisan
politics approach
Parties’ policy preferences are
driven by their industrial class
base (labour v. capital)
Stable hypotheses on left- v.
right-wing policy preferences:
more v. less generous welfare
policies
Changing electoral
constituencies
Parties’ policy preferences are
driven by the interests of
their current, post-industrial
electorate
Hypotheses need to be updated
to take new electorates into
account. This can be done by
either looking directly at
micro-level preferences of
voters, or by re-classifying
parties into new categories
depending on their electorate
Context: Party
competition, party
system, institutions
Parties’ policy preferences are
driven by party interaction
with the institutional context
and with competing parties,
i.e. by the position of a party
in the party system
Requires accounting for context:
presence and strength of
competitors, cleavages
structuring party system,
electoral institutions
Party–voter linkages Parties’ policy preferences
depend on the kind of
linkages they use to mobilize
voters (programmatic v.
particularistic)
The traditional approach applies
only to programmatic
linkages. Control for degree
of particularism or adapt
dependent variable: the more
particularistically a party
mobilizes, the narrower its
preferred policies.
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isolated parties unless we account for the environment in which they operate. Finally, a third
strand of research argues that the underlying assumption of programmatic voter–party
linkages in partisan politics theory does not always hold. Even in developed democracies,
some parties mobilize voters with clientelistic or particularistic practices, which alter our
expectations of the policies they advocate.
We presented two kinds of consequences that follow from these three ‘new schools’ of
partisan politics research. First, they suggest that the traditional approach should be
applied to a more limited set of empirical cases only, i.e. to countries with class-related
electoral constituencies that correspond to the social structure of the industrial era,
bipolar party systems, and a programmatic mode of party competition. Secondly, we
discussed how the theory of party politics and the welfare state outside of these scope
conditions should be adapted. As we have pointed out, it may sufﬁce to update partisan
theory to take into account the changes in the composition of electoral constituencies, or
to acknowledge constraints on party policies stemming from particular patterns of party
competition. However, it may be necessary to re-conceptualize our model of party politics
more fundamentally, in order to account for strategic motivations of policy decisions that
are conditioned by the conﬁguration of party competition and that are sometimes guided
by particularistic electoral strategies.
One of the most important questions for further research is to investigate to what extent
parties’ policy decisions are still based on the representation of identiﬁable constituencies
and social interests, and to what extent policy choices are motivated by the need to
compete with rival parties over speciﬁc groups of voters. The answer to this question
requires that we integrate the study of voters, parties and policies. Welfare state research
can beneﬁt greatly from adopting insights of electoral studies and party research. In the
debates that we have outlined, we already see that part of the welfare studies literature has
moved closer to these other ﬁelds of comparative politics and we believe this to be both
necessary and beneﬁcial for our understanding of welfare state development.
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